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1. Introduction
The treaty recognition of  the respect for national identity in the EU legal order 
and the concomitant emergence of  constitutional identity as a (potential) yardstick 
for review of  EU law by national constitutional courts – e.g., through the case-law 
of  the German Federal Constitutional Court regarding the Maastricht and Lisbon 
treaties1 – continues to have ramifications in the Union. It has led, for instance, to 
an intensification of  the judicial dialogue in the EU both vertically between national 
courts and the Court of  Justice of  the European Union (“CJEU”) and horizontally 
between national courts. 
Against this background of  an ever-changing landscape, stand the ostensibly 
immutable provisions of  the Agreement of  the European Economic Area (“EEA”) 
signed in 1992, a year before the eventual entry into force of  the Maastricht Treaty. 
Agreed to in the era immediately preceding the creation of  the EU, the EEA Agreement 
essentially extends the provisions of  what became known as the Internal Market to the 
EFTA-EEA states of  Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. Charged with authoritatively 
interpreting the Agreement’s provisions for those EFTA-EEA states is the EFTA 
Court,2 the remit of  which is to ensure the continuing homogeneity between EU law 
and EEA law and thus to avoid future divergences in interpretation between the two 
legal systems. As will be seen in this article, the EFTA Court has responded to these 
challenges by developing the principle of  “dynamic interpretation” in its approach to 
its decision-making.
Within this framework, then, the present article seeks to address one particular 
issue of  the horizontal judicial dialogue of  the CJEU and the EFTA Court,3 related to 
the possible migration of  constitutional ideas4 between the EU and the EFTA-EEA 
states. That is the putative reception – mediated by the EFTA Court – into the EEA 
legal order of  the principle of  the respect of  national identity, most recently articulated 
in treaty form in Art 4(2) TEU. It will be argued that such principle – although currently 
indeterminate in scope – is likely to come to play a greater role in the Internal Market 
and the CJEU’s own decision-making and will thus impact, in due course, on the EEA 
legal order. How such impact might play out will also be briefly considered.
1 A.F. Tatham, Central European Constitutional Courts in the Face of  EU Membership: The Influence of  the 
German Model of  Integration in Hungary and Poland, 2013, 106-112. Some courts have followed the 
specific German lead, including Hungary (Tatham, ibid, 186-189) and Poland (Tatham, ibid, 245-
252), while other national constitutional tribunals have developed their own understandings of  the 
core of  national sovereignty immune from EU law: these include the French Constitutional Council 
with its concept of  “the essential conditions for the exercise of  national sovereignty,” developed 
in such cases as the Schengen Agreement case (Cons. constit. 25 juillet 1991, n. 294, Rec. 91) and 
the EU Constitutional Treaty case (Cons. constit. 19 novembre 2004, n. 505, Rec. 173); the Italian 
Constitutional Court with its counter-limits doctrine (for a lucid exposition of  this doctrine, see M. 
Cartabia & J.H.H. Weiler, L’Italia in Europa. Profili istituzionali e costituzionali, il Mulino, Bologna, 2000, 
129–133 and 171–172); and, more recently though less distinctly so far, the UK Supreme Court with 
its understanding of  “constitutional statutes” in its ruling in R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v. Secretary of  
State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3, [2014] 1 WLR 324.
2 See the excellent and varied contributions to the volume commemorating the 20th year of  the 
Court’s operation in EFTA Court (ed), The EEA and the EFTA Court: Decentred Integration, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2015. 
3 C. Baudenbacher, “The EFTA Court: An Actor in the European Judicial Dialogue”, in Fordham 
International Law Journal, Vol. 28:353, 2005.
4 On the notion of  the migration of  constitutional ideas, see S. Choudhry (ed.), The Migration of  
Constitutional Ideas, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007.
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2. National identity and the European Union
The recognition of  national identity as a discrete concept was originally introduced 
by the Maastricht Treaty and provided under then Art F(1) TEU that: “The Union shall 
respect the national identities of  the Member States, whose systems of  government 
are founded on the principles of  democracy.” The Amsterdam Treaty revised the 
numbering, Art 6(3) TEU, and removed the dependent clause.
Further development was proposed through Art I-5 of  the draft Constitutional 
Treaty, the progenitor of  Art 4(2) TEU, quoted below. The relevant Working Group 
in the Convention noted5 that its discussions, when dealing with the wording of  
this provision, had centred on two core areas of  national responsibilities, viz.: (1) 
fundamental structures and essential functions of  a Member State which were included 
in Art I-5 CT (and later retained in Art 4(2) TEU); and (2) basic public policy choices 
and social values of  a Member State including tax policies; social welfare benefits 
system; educational system; public health care system; and cultural preservation and 
development. Interestingly, choice of  languages was considered as part of  the first 
group, not the second. Nevertheless, as a result of  its deliberations, the Working 
Group members generally agreed that the revised clause would not require any specific 
mentioning of  the latter basic policy choices of  the Member States.
The Lisbon Treaty largely kept the wording of  Art I-5 CT (adding the point on 
equality) and now provides in Art 4(2) TEU:
The Union shall respect the equality of  Member States before the Treaties 
as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, 
political and constitutional, inclusive of  regional and local self-government. 
It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial 
integrity of  the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national 
security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of  
each Member State.
Van der Schyff  has argued6 that Union respect for national identities is to be 
understood as meaning exclusively the protection of  the individual constitutional 
identity of  the Member States. Nevertheless, the Working Group’s approach to basic 
policy choices as part of  national identity contextualizes the wording of  Art I-5 CT/
Art 4(2) TEU, so that a narrow, “constitutional” interpretation of  national identities 
does not represent the intention of  the drafters of  that provision. In fact, “national 
identity” must be seen as a much broader concept within the context of  the Union.7
3. Protection of  national identity in the Internal Market
(a) An inherent, broad and inclusive notion of national identity
Treaty-based protection of  national identity may be seen to have a progeny 
5 G. Amato & J. Ziller, “The European Constitution: Cases and Materials”, in EU and Member States’ 
Law, 2007, 157-158.
6 G. van der Schyff, “The Constitutional Relationship between the European Union and its Member 
States: The Role of  National Identity in Article 4(2) TEU”, in European law review, 37(5):563-583 • 
2012, 567-571.
7 Support for this contention may be found through examining the clause’s history: B. Guastaferro, 
“Beyond the Exceptionalism of  Constitutional Conflicts: The Ordinary Function of  the Identity 
Clause”, in Yearbook of  European Law, 31 (1), 2012, 263-318.
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dating back to the very beginnings of  European integration. The views of  Poiares 
Maduro AG in Michaniki, where he elaborated on the notion of  Member State 
identity, are worthwhile considering in detail as they form the framework for the 
ensuing discussion:8
It is true that the European Union is obliged to respect the constitutional identity of  
the Member States. That obligation has existed from the outset. It indeed forms part of  
the very essence of  the European project initiated at the beginning of  the 1950s, which 
consists of  following the path of  integration whilst maintaining the political existence 
of  the States. That is shown by the fact that the obligation was explicitly 
stated for the first time upon a revision of  the treaties, a reminder of  the 
obligation being regarded as necessary by the Member States in view of  
the further integration provided for. Thus, Article F(1) of  the Maastricht 
Treaty, now Article 6(3) of  the Treaty on European Union, provides that 
“the Union shall respect the national identities of  its Member States.” 
The national identity concerned clearly includes the constitutional identity 
of  the Member State. That is confirmed, if  such was necessary, by the 
explanation of  the aspects of  national identity put forward in Article I-5 
of  the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and Article 4(2) of  
the Treaty on European Union as amended by the Treaty of  Lisbon. It 
appears, indeed, from the identical wording of  those two instruments that 
the Union respects the “national identities [of  Member States], inherent in 
their fundamental structures, political and constitutional.” 
The case-law has already drawn certain conclusions from that obligation imposed on 
the European Union by the founding instruments to respect the national identity of  the 
Member States, including at the level of  their constitutions. It is apparent 
from a close reading of  that case-law that a Member State may, in certain 
cases and subject, evidently, to review by the Court, assert the protection 
of  its national identity in order to justify a derogation from the application 
of  the fundamental freedoms of  movement. It may, first of  all, explicitly rely 
on it as a legitimate and independent ground of  derogation. [Emphasis supplied.]
Poiares Maduro’s contentions may be restated as follows: (i) the obligation 
to respect the constitutional identity of  Member States existed from the outset of  
the European project and is therefore inherent in the Treaties; (ii) since the Lisbon 
Treaty amendments entered into force, it is now a separate ground for justifying 
derogation from the freedoms of  the Internal Market; and (iii) national identity 
“includes” constitutional identity. These three points are all vital components of  
the arguments in this study to which further reference will be made later. Echoing 
the words of  Poiares Maduro, Besselink’s views are also interesting when he 
considers “national identity” in a broader manner, comprising multiple identities 
and encapsulating cultural identities as well.9 It might therefore be considered that 
the notion of  “national identity” is one which the CJEU may imbue with further 
8 Opinion of  Poiares Maduro AG in Judgment Michaniki, Case C-213/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:544, 
paras. 31-32.
9 L. Besselink, “National and constitutional identity before and after Lisbon”, in Utrecht Law Review, 
6(3), 2010, 42-44.
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content through its case-law or that it acts as an umbrella under which a variety of  
issues might coalesce together.
(b) Free movement and Member States’ margin of appreciation
The protection of  national identity in a broad sense has therefore existed from 
the outset of  integration within the context of  the Internal Market10 and was intended 
to be retained under the Constitutional Treaty and subsequent Lisbon Treaty. 
Understood in this way, “national identity” has been protected under a series 
of  Treaty exceptions allowing Member States a degree of  discretion to keep in place 
national rules that, while forming a barrier to the exercise of  the free movement 
rights, may nevertheless be justified on the basis of  those exceptions. Sweeney11 has 
analysed this “margin of  appreciation” through the CJEU’s case-law on the four 
freedoms, demonstrating that the doctrine plays a role across the different categories 
of  restriction. In balancing European (ostensibly economic but increasingly socio-
political) aims against more local values, the CJEU has inevitably been drawn into 
a discussion about the suitability, necessity and proportionality of  the national 
measures in question.
On the one hand, for example, Art 36 TFEU permits national measures that 
infringe the right to free movement of  goods where they can be justified, inter alia, 
on grounds of  public morality, public policy or public health. Free movement of  
persons and the freedoms of  establishment and to provide (and receive) services 
are subject to limitations justified on the grounds of  public policy, public security 
or public health;12 moreover, none of  these rights can be applied to employment in 
the public service or to activities which in the relevant Member State are connected 
with the exercise of  official authority.13 However, these exceptions must not – in 
effect – amount to disguised restrictions on these free movement rights and the 
CJEU remains vigilant to the claims of  Member States in these situations and polices 
the limits to these exceptions.14 Thus, while the Treaties and CJEU case-law allow 
the Member States a margin of  appreciation in protecting their national identity, the 
exercise and extent of  the applicability of  such exceptions are kept firmly within the 
competence of  the CJEU: such approach is mirrored in the CJEU case-law under 
Art 4(2) TEU which will be considered later.15
The general requirement on EU Member States, to ensure no national 
impediments exist to the exercise of  the free movement rights, can be tempered 
with the need to protect the State’s identity. In Schmidberger,16 the Austrian authorities’ 
failure to ban a demonstration (thereby causing a 30-hour closure of  a major 
motorway) was capable of  restricting intra-Union trade in goods under Arts 34 and 
35 TFEU but could be objectively justified on the grounds of  the fundamental rights 
to freedom of  expression and assembly. Since both the Union and its Member States 
10 J. Hojnik, “The EU Internal Market and National Tradition and Culture: Any Room for Market 
Decentralisation?”, in Croatian yearbook of  European law & policy, Vol. 8, No. 8, 2012, 123-134. 
11 J.A. Sweeney, “A ‘Margin of  Appreciation’ in the Internal Market: Lessons from the European 
Court of  Human Rights”, in Legal issues of  economic integration, 34 (1), 2007, 32-48.
12 Workers, Art 45(3) TFEU; establishment, Art 52 TFEU; services, Art 62 TFEU.  
13 Workers, Art 45(4) TFEU; establishment, Art 51 TFEU; services, Art 62 TFEU. 
14 Case 13/68 Salgoil ECLI:EU:C:1968:54, 463.
15 Besselink, footnote 9, 44-45, who emphasizes the need for dialogue between the national courts 
and CJEU in calibrating the balance between EU freedoms and national identity.
16 Judgment Schmidberger, Case C-112/00, ECLI:EU:C:2003:333.
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were required to respect fundamental rights, their protection was a legitimate interest 
which justified the restriction of  a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty, 
such as the free movement of  goods.
Protection of  national identity possesses a certain progeny in CJEU case-law: in 
Groener,17 the relevant Irish law provided that teachers in vocational schools in Ireland 
were required to be proficient in the Irish language. The CJEU ultimately ruled the 
language proficiency requirements permissible – in view of  a clear policy of  national 
law to maintain and promote the use of  the language as a means of  expressing national 
identity and culture – provided they were not disproportionate to their objectives. 
On the other hand, the Cassis de Dijon case18 has also allowed the CJEU to elaborate 
further on the field of  discretion left to Member States in their ability to create or 
maintain in place non-discriminatory measures.19 These measures, having equivalent 
effect to quantitative restrictions, which are indistinctly applicable and infringe the free 
movement of  goods under Art 34 TFEU might be found to be lawful under EU law 
if  they are both objectively justified and proportionate.
The CJEU consequently regarded as objective justifications the legitimate interests 
of  social and economic policy20 as well as cultural interests.21 National rules on shop 
opening hours were also covered,22 provided their purpose was to ensure that working 
and non-working hours were so arranged as to accord with “national or regional socio-
cultural characteristics” which phrase was subsequently held to include laws for the 
protection of  workers.23
Consequently, despite the presumption in favour of  free trade in the Internal 
Market, the Treaties and CJEU case-law already allowed the Member States to retain 
a strictly-defined competence lawfully to limit free trade, in order to protect certain 
important domestic interests related to national identity before the EEA Agreement was 
signed.
(c) Protection of national identity since Maastricht 
As mentioned above, the express mention of  the Union’s respect for national 
identity dates from the Maastricht Treaty and has been developed in ensuing 
amendments. In Commission v. Luxembourg,24 a pre-Lisbon case, the CJEU considered 
that the protection of  national identities of  Member States was a legitimate objective 
that the EU legal order had to respect.25 In other cases, e.g., UTECA,26 respect for 
national identity encompassed other values protected by the Treaty such as cultural and 
linguistic diversity. 
17 Judgment Groener, Case 379/87, ECLI:EU:C:1989:599.
18 Judgment Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein,“Cassis de Dijon”, Case C-120/78 
ECLI:EU:C:1979:42.
19 Judgment Gebhard, Case C-55/94, ECLI:EU:C:1995:411. 
20 Judgment Oebel, Case 155/80, ECLI:EU:C:1981:177. 
21 Judgment Cinéthèque, Cases 60 and 61/84, ECLI:EU:C:1985:329.
22 Judgment Torfaen BC v. B & Q PLC, Case 145/88, ECLI:EU:C:1989:593. 
23 Judgment UCGT, Case C-312/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:93; and Judgment Marchandise, Case C-332/89, 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:94. 
24 Judgment Commission v. Luxembourg, Case C-473/93 ECLI:EU:C:1996:263, para. 35.
25 Subsequently affirmed in Judgment, Commission v. Luxembourg, Case C-51/08 ECLI:EU:C:2011:336, 
para. 124: protection of  the Luxemburgish language, however, could be achieved in a more 
proportionate way than by generally excluding nationals of  other Member States from performing 
activities as notaries.
26 Judgment UTECA, Case C-222/07, ECLI:EU:C:2009:124. 
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Guastaferro considers27 that Art 4(2) TEU (and its predecessors) has been used by 
the CJEU in two ways: first, as an autonomous internal market ground of  derogation, 
i.e., as a justification for a national measure that had been found to be inconsistent with 
a fundamental freedom under the Treaty; and secondly and more importantly for the 
present argument, the identity clause has been employed as a rule of  interpretation of  
existing internal market grounds for derogation.
The CJEU has evolved its case-law on the identity clause;28 in the Omega case, 
it balanced the right to human dignity (under German Constitution Art 1) with the 
freedom to provide services holding that:29 “Since both the Community and its Member 
States are required to respect fundamental rights, the protection of  those rights is a 
legitimate interest which, in principle, justifies a restriction of  the obligations imposed 
by Community law, even under a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty such 
as the freedom to provide services.”
Further in Laval, the CJEU made an express reference to the importance of  the 
right to collective action enshrined in Art 17 of  the Swedish Constitution and pointed 
out30 that exercising the right to take collective action “for the protection of  the workers 
of  the host State against possible social dumping may constitute an overriding reason 
of  public interest within the meaning of  the case law of  the Court which, in principle, 
justifies a restriction of  one of  the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty.” 
The CJEU returned to the issue of  national identity in Sayn-Wittgenstein, in which 
the complainant had argued that an Austrian constitutional rule prohibiting use of  
noble titles infringed her free movement rights. In considering the issue, the CJEU 
stated:31 “[I]n accordance with Article 4(2) TEU, the European Union is to respect 
the national identities of  its Member States, which include the status of  the State as a 
Republic.” It further noted:32 “[A]ny restriction on the rights of  free movement which 
would result for Austrian citizens from the application of  the provisions at issue in the 
main proceedings are therefore justified in the light of  the history and fundamental 
values of  the Republic of  Austria.” The CJEU in Sayn-Wittgenstein appears impliedly 
to have used Art 4(2) TEU to support the justification of  the restriction on EU rights 
caused by the Austrian constitutional prohibition on noble titles.33 Through Runevič-
Vardya, the CJEU extended the concept of  national identity under Art 4(2) TEU to 
cover protection of  the official language of  a Member State34 being a legitimate aim 
capable of  justifying restrictions on EU free movement rights.35
The concept of  protection of  national identity received support from the CJEU 
27 Guastaferro, footnote 7, 290-299.
28 For an extensive and detailed analysis of  CJEU case-law related to this subject, see T. 
Konstadinides, “Constitutional Identity as a Shield and as a Sword: The European Legal Order 
within the Framework of  National Constitutional Settlement”, in Cambridge Yearbook of  
European Legal Studies, Vol. 13, 2010-2011, 195-218. 
29 Judgment Omega, Case C-36/02, ECLI:EU:C:2004:614, para. 35.
30 Judgment Laval, Case C-341/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:809, para. 103. 
31 Judgment Sayn-Wittgenstein, Case C-208/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:806, para. 96.
32 Ibid, para. 75. 
33 A. von Bogdandy & S. Schill, “Overcoming absolute primacy: Respect for national identity under 
the Lisbon Treaty”, in Common Market Law Review, 48, Issue 5, 2011, 1417–1453, 1424.
34 Judgment Runevič-Vardyn, Case C-391/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:291, para. 86.
35 See more recently, Judgment O’Brien, Case C-393/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:110, para. 49, regarding 
the Latvian Government’s objection to EU law on part-time work and pay being applied to judges 
as amounting to an infringement of  national identity.
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– echoing its earlier ruling in Omega36 – when it stated in Sayn-Wittgenstein that:37 “[T]he 
specific circumstances which may justify recourse to the concept of  public policy may 
vary from one Member State to another and from one era to another. The competent 
national authorities must therefore be allowed a margin of  discretion within the 
limits imposed by the Treaty.” In Gambelli, the CJEU had previously said:38 “[M]oral, 
religious and cultural factors ... could serve to justify the existence on the part of  the 
national authority of  a margin of  appreciation sufficient to enable them to require 
what consumer protection and the preservation of  public order require.” Although 
this would appear to mean that national identity as a ground for justification might 
be invoked with respect to specific national interests, this does not imply a blanket 
acceptance of  all national rules (when claimed by Member States) as furnishing the 
appropriate basis for justifiable restrictions on (the exercise of) EU law rights.39
4. National identity and the EFTA Court
(a) Guaranteeing homogeneity between the Union and the EFTA-EEA
In view of  the international law nature of  the EEA Agreement and the need 
to avoid divergences between the decision-making of  the CJEU and the EFTA 
Court, the drafters of  the Agreement created special homogeneity rules. According 
to the Agreement,40 the EFTA Court is supposed: (a) to interpret provisions of  that 
Agreement that are identical in substance to corresponding rules in the TFEU in 
conformity with the relevant rulings of  the CJEU rendered before the Agreement 
was signed on 2 May 1992; and (b) to pay due account to relevant CJEU rulings after 
that date.
However, the EFTA Court recognized41 that the establishment of  a dynamic and 
homogeneous market was inherent in the general objective of  the EEA Agreement 
and, in turn, took the view that EEA law might be dynamically interpreted if  this 
were necessary in order to achieve judicial homogeneity.42 In practice, the EFTA 
Court does not distinguish between pre- and post-May 1992 CJEU case-law, thereby 
respecting it in its entirety43 and applying it directly without temporal discrimination 
in cases before it. 
In addition, the principle of  homogeneity has led to “a presumption that 
provisions framed identically in the EEA Agreement and the EC Treaty are to be 
construed in the same way”44 while also acknowledging that there were “certain 
differences in the scope and purpose of  the EEA Agreement as compared to the EC 
36 Judgment Omega, Case C-36/02, footnote 29, para. 31.
37 Judgment Sayn-Wittgenstein, Case C-208/09, footnote 31, para. 87.
38 Judgment Gambelli, Case C-243/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:597, para. 63.
39 On the balancing between EU law and the common constitutional traditions of  the Member 
States, and between EU law and specific national constitutional provisions, G. Martinico & O. 
Pollicino, The Interaction between Europe’s Legal Systems: Judicial Dialogue and the Creation of  Supranational 
Law, 2012, 228-238.
40 Article 6 EEA and Art 3(2) of  the EFTA Surveillance and Court Agreement. 
41 Judgment Karlsson, Case E-4/01, [2002] EFTA Ct Rep 240.
42 Judgment Pedicel, Case E-4/04, [2005] EFTA Ct Rep 1.
43 V. Skouris, “The ECJ and the EFTA Court under the EEA Agreement: A Paradigm for 
International Cooperation between Judicial Institutions”, in The EFTA Court: Ten Years On, C. 
Baudenbacher, P. Tresselt & T. Örlygsson (eds), 123, 2005, 124-125.
44 Judgment Surveillance Authority v. Norway, Case E-2/06, EFTA [2007] EFTA Ct Rep 163, para. 59, 
Emphasis supplied.
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Treaty which may under specific circumstances lead to a different interpretation.”45 
Nevertheless, in L’Oréal, the EFTA Court concluded that only “compelling reasons”46 
could justify divergent interpretations of  the same rule under EU and EEA law: in 
so doing it also raised the threshold for allowing differences in purpose and context 
to justify derogation from the homogeneity principle.47
The EFTA Court in its case-law has therefore overcome the apparent temporal 
limitations imposed by the EEA Agreement on its acceptance and use of  CJEU 
case-law and, through the “compelling reasons” test of  L’Oréal, has set an even 
higher threshold for divergent interpretations of  the same or similarly-worded legal 
rules in the EU and EEA legal orders. As Fredriksen has contended:48 “Thus, we can 
safely assume that it will be very difficult for the EFTA States to advance differences 
in context and purpose between EEA law and EU law in order to secure greater 
political leeway than the ECJ allows the EU Member States.”
(b) Creation of the EEA legal order by the EFTA Court
Having asserted in Sveinbjörnsdóttir49 that the EEA Agreement was an international 
treaty sui generis which contained a distinct legal order of  its own, in words reminiscent 
of  the CJEU in Van Gend en Loos,50 the EFTA Court subsequently recognized51 that 
this distinct legal order was characterized by the creation of  an internal market, the 
protection of  the rights of  individuals and economic operators and an institutional 
framework providing for effective surveillance and judicial review.
In fleshing out this economic constitutional order of  the EEA – much in 
the same way the CJEU attempted to do with the EU legal order from the 1960s 
onwards52 – the EFTA Court has been inspired by the CJEU-created fundamentals 
of  the Union legal order. However the EFTA Court evidently works in a different 
policy universe and has to maintain the axiomatic dichotomy of  membership of  the 
Internal Market (and thus the core of  the European project) with the respect for 
(Nordic) notions of  sovereignty vis-à-vis the inherent supranationalism of  the EU 
institutional system.53
While  the EFTA Court has rejected the direct “importation” of  the principles 
of  primacy and direct effect54 from the EU system since the necessary supranational 
element is absent from the EEA system, it has nevertheless introduced EEA-
45 Judgment Rainford-Towning, Case E-3/98, [1998] EFTA Ct Rep 205, para. 21.
46 Judgment L’Oréal, Joined Cases E-9/07 and E-10/07, [2008] EFTA Ct Rep 258, para. 37. 
47 H.H. Fredriksen, “The EFTA Court 15 Years On”, in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
Vol. 59, 2010, 731-760, 741. 
48 Ibid, 743. 
49 Judgment, Sveinbjörnsdóttir, Case E-9/97, [1998] EFTA Ct Rep 95, para. 59.
50 Judgment Van Gend en Loos, Case 26/62, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1, 12. 
51 Judgment Ásgeirsson, Case E-2/03, [2003] EFTA Ct Rep 185, para. 28.
52 K. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of  European Law: The Making of  an International Rule of  Law in 
Europe, Oxford University Press, 2001.
53 H.P. Graver, “Mission Impossible: Supranationality and National Legal Autonomy in the EEA 
Agreement”, in European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 7, Issue 1, 2002, 73–90, 74-76.
54 W. van Gerven, “The Genesis of  EEA Law and the Principles of  Primacy and Direct Effect”, 
in Fordham International Law Journal, 1992-1993, 955, 985-989; and L. Sevón & M. Johansson, “The 
protection of  the rights of  individuals under the EEA Agreement”, in European Law Review, 24, 
1999, 378-383.
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equivalent concepts55 of  “quasi-direct effect,”56 “quasi-supremacy,”57 full state 
liability,58 indirect effect or consistent interpretation,59 effectiveness of  remedies 
protecting infringement of  rights under EEA law,60 general principles of  law61 
(including fundamental rights)62 and even the emergence of  an EEA citizenship in 
line with the parallel EU citizenship.63 Such activism has allowed the EFTA Court to 
emulate some of  the main constitutional bases of  the Union legal order set out in 
CJEU rulings,64 albeit in a circumscribed manner and based on the fact that, whilst 
the depth of  integration under the EEA Agreement is less far-reaching than under 
the TEU and TFEU, the scope and objective of  the EEA nevertheless go beyond 
what is usual for an agreement under public international law.65
(c) Protection of national identity in the EEA 
It will be recalled from Poiares Maduro’s earlier proposition that national 
identity protection has been inherent in the Union Treaties from the very beginning. 
If  that is the case, then respect for such identity was transferred from the Union to 
the EEA system through the same or similarly-worded provisions, at least to the 
extent where that is guaranteed under the Internal Market.
The EEA Agreement for its part replicates the free movement provisions of  
the Internal Market and the Treaty exceptions to them:66 thus, following the earlier 
scheme, Art 13 EEA permits national measures that infringe the right to free 
movement of  goods where they can be justified, inter alia, on grounds of  public 
morality, public policy or public health.67 Free movement of  persons and the freedoms 
of  establishment and services are subject to limitations justified on the grounds of  
public policy, public security or public health;68 and the public service exception is 
also maintained in respect of  the same freedoms.69 Moreover, the EFTA Court has 
also seen fit to approve the Cassis de Dijon jurisprudence in its own decision-making.70
Within the framework of  the EEA Agreement and the relevant CJEU case-
55 C. Baudenbacher, The EFTA Court Ten Years On, Baudenbacher, Tresselt & Örlygsson (eds), 
footnote 43, 13, 25-26.
56 Judgment Restamark, Case E-1/94, [1994-1995] EFTA Ct Rep 15.
57 Judgment Einarsson, Case E-1/01, [2002] EFTA Ct Rep 1. 
58 Judgment Sveinbjörnsdóttir, Case E-9/97, nº 49.
59 Judgment Karlsson, Case E-4/01, nº 41. 
60 Judgment Ásgeirsson, Case E-2/03, nº 51, para. 28. 
61 Judgment Sigmarsson, Case E-3/11, [2011] EFTA Ct Rep 430.
62 Judgment TV 1000, Case E-8/97, [1998] EFTA Ct Rep 68; Judgment Bellona, Case E-2/02 [2003] 
EFTA Ct Rep 52; and Judgment Ásgeirsson, Case E-2/03, footnote 51.
63 Judgment Clauder, Case E-4/11, [2011] EFTA Ct Rep 218, para. 49.
64 The arguments on the possible parallel constitutionalization of  the EEA legal order are set out 
in T. Burri & B. Pirker, “Constitutionalization by Association? The Doubtful Case of  the European 
Economic Area”, in Yearbook of  European Law, 32 (1), 2013, 207-229. The authors ultimately 
consider the EEA to fall short of  a true constitutional regime, at this time.
65 Judgment Sveinbjörnsdóttir, Case E-9/97, footnote 49.
66 P.-C. Müller-Graff, “The Impact of  Climate, Geography and Other Non-Legal Factors on EC 
Law and EEA Law”, in The EFTA Court Ten Years On, Baudenbacher, Tresselt & Örlygsson (eds), 
footnote 43, 55, 65-66.
67 Following the similarly-worded Art 36 TFEU, the EFTA Court has ensured that such exceptions to 
free movement of  goods are construed restrictively: Judgment Restamark, Case E-1/94, footnote 56.
68 Workers, Art 28(3) EEA; establishment, Art 33 EEA; services, Art 39 EEA. 
69 Workers, Art 28(4) EEA; establishment, Art 32 EEA; services, Art 39 EEA. 
70 Judgment Restamark¸Case E-1/94, footnote 56.
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law, then, the EFTA Court has already deal extensively with the economic freedoms 
and their permissible limitations;71 on a number of  occasions, it has been faced with 
claims that such freedoms should not apply because of  an objectively justifiable 
reason related to national identity. In fact, it has been argued that the lack of  
supranationality of  the EEA Agreement might allow for some further leeway in 
the conduct of  EFTA-EEA states with a dualistic approach to international law72 
in respect of  national identity than would be available to EU Member States. 
Commentators have variously grouped these mandatory requirements together in 
terms of  features related to geography, population and culture.73 
Thus the deep-rooted Nordic public health policies regarding alcohol 
consumption were considered in the context of  national alcohol monopolies;74 
public health also came into play on food labelling and food additives.75 Similarly, the 
strong Nordic tradition of  workers’ protection76 as well as ensuring gender equality77 
have been argued as justifying national restrictions on the exercise of  EEA rights. 
Even intellectual property rights in the context of  free trade and the protection of  
consumer interests may be proffered as examples of  national identity.78 
Lastly, the geographical situation in all three EFTA-EEA states has been called 
into play, in reality as examples of  national identity justifying domestic measures 
that otherwise impinge upon the economic freedoms under the EEA Agreement: 
Norwegian state aid policy used in trying to improve working conditions in under-
populated and remote regions,79 Icelandic tax differences on internal and external 
flights,80 and the scarcity of  (building) land in Liechtenstein81 are all features that have 
been argued before the EFTA Court as objectively justifying national restrictions on 
free movement rights.
Taking these examples and the earlier arguments on the broad concept of  
“national identity,” inherent in the Treaties and encompassing the “constitutional 
identity” of  Member States, it is conceivable that this concept is already part of  the 
EFTA-EEA legal order.
(d) Limiting national identity protection in the EEA 
Nevertheless, despite its predisposition towards reception of  EU principles 
71 Judgment EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Norway (“Kellogg’s”), Case E-3/00, [2000-2001] EFTA Ct 
Rep 73; Judgment Piazza, Case E-10/04, [2005] EFTA Ct Rep 76. 
72 Müller-Graf, footnote 66, 64.
73 Baudenbacher, footnote 55, 16-20; and Müller-Graf, footnote 66, 67-68. 
74 Judgment Restamark, Case E-1/94, footnote 56 (Finnish import monopoly contrary to free 
movement of  goods) and Judgment Wilhelmsen, Case E-6/96, [1997] EFTA Ct Rep 53 (Norwegian 
retail monopoly upheld subject to conditions).
75 Judgment CIBA, Case E-6/01, [2002] EFTA Ct Rep 281; Judgment Allied Colloids, Case E-2/00, 
[2000-2001] EFTA Ct Rep 35; and Judgment EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Norway, Case E-3/00, 
footnote 71.
76 Judgment Samuelsson, Case E-1/95, [1994-1995] EFTA Ct Rep 145; Judgment Sveinbjörnsdóttir, Case 
E-9/97, footnote 49; and Judgment LO, Case E-8/00, [2002] EFTA Ct Rep 114.
77 Judgment EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Norway, “Postdoc”, Case E-1/02, [2003] EFTA Ct Rep 1. 
78 Judgment Maglite, Case E-2/97, [1997] EFTA Ct Rep 127; Judgment Astra Norge, Case E-1/98, 
[1998] EFTA Ct Rep 140; Judgment Merck v. Paranova, Case E-3/02, [2003] EFTA Ct Rep 101; and 
Judgment TV 1000, Case E-8/97, footnote 62.
79 Judgment Norway v. EFTA Surveillance Authority, Case E-6/98, [1999] EFTA Ct Rep 74.
80 Judgment Surveillance Authority v. Iceland, Case E-1/03, EFTA [2003] EFTA Ct Rep 143.
81 Judgment Rainford-Towning, Case E-3/98, footnote 45; Judgment Brändle, Case E-4/00, [2000-
2001] EFTA Ct Rep 123; and Judgment Pucher, Case E-2/01, [2002] EFTA Ct Rep 44.
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enunciated by the CJEU, the EFTA Court has been very wary of  attempts to extend 
the range of  legitimate considerations that can be used to justify restrictions on the 
four freedoms82 and has thus effectively circumscribed national identity protection 
more acutely than may be found in CJEU case-law. The EFTA Court’s approach 
thus appears to be designed to limit EFTA-EEA States’ political latitude on policy 
grounds:83  aving inserted a certain “safety margin” into its interpretation of  EEA 
law and interpreted any respect for or protection of  national identity in a stricter way 
– within the area of  free movement rights – than allowed by the CJEU under EU law 
(cf  Groener with Einarsson in the next paragraph), the EFTA Court has consciously 
avoided provoking possible CJEU reactions to imbalances between the Contracting 
Parties’ obligations.84 
In fact, the EFTA Court has so far ignored use of  a broad or innovative concept 
of  “respect for national identities” in its decision-making.85 In Einarsson,86 the 
Icelandic and Norwegian governments argued unsuccessfully that the preservation 
of  the Icelandic language as a central component of  that state’s cultural heritage and 
national identity should be allowed to justify derogation from the prohibition against 
discriminatory taxation in Art 14 EEA. The EFTA Court was unable to use cultural 
policy by analogous application to Art 151(4) EC (now Art 167(4) TFEU)87 as there 
was no parallel provision in the EEA Agreement. Moreover when referring to the 
predecessor of  Art 4(2) TEU (Art 6(3) TEU, pre-Lisbon), the EFTA Court further 
stuck to the limitations imposed by the wording of  the relevant treaties:88
It has further been suggested that Article 6(3) TEU might offer a basis 
for derogation, since language is central to the maintenance of  the national 
identity of  a State. The Court notes that the EEA Agreement contains 
no corresponding provision. Since the Treaty on European Union was 
negotiated before the conclusion of  the EEA Agreement, it must be assumed 
that this discrepancy is intentional. The Court cannot base its reasoning on 
the analogous application of  Article 6(3) TEU in the instant case.
In rejecting such analogous application of  both provisions, the EFTA Court 
held89 that “it would not be a proper exercise of  the judicial function to seek to 
extend the scope of  application of  the EEA Agreement on that basis.” The EFTA 
Court took the same position the following year in the Postdoc case90 when it noted 
that what is now Art 157(4) TFEU, upon which the Norwegian Government based 
82 C. Baudenbacher, “Zur Auslegung des EWR-Rechts durch den EFTA-Gerichtshof ”, in Festschrift 
für Günter Hirsch, G. Müller et al (eds), 2008, 27, 49.
83 Fredriksen, footnote 47, 757-758. 
84 Problems concerning the direct effect of  provisions of  the EEC-Portugal Free Trade Agreement 
are relevant here: Judgment Polydor, Case 270/80 ECLI:EU:C:1982:43; and Judgment Kupferberg, 
Case 104/81 ECLI:EU:C:1982:362.
85 The limits to transfers in general are discussed by the Court in Judgment Karlsson, Case E-4/01, 
footnote 41, paras. 28-30; and Judgment L’Oréal, Joined Cases E-9/07 and E-10/07, footnote 46, 
para. 28.
86 Judgment Einarsson, Case E-1/01, footnote 57.
87 “The Union shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of  the 
Treaties, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of  its cultures.”
88 Judgment Einarsso, Case E-1/01, footnote 57, para. 43.
89 Ibid, para. 45.
90 Judgment EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Norway, “Postdoc”, Case E-1/02, footnote 77.
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its arguments, had not been made part of  the EEA Agreement. As a result, that 
provision could not be applied91 as “a legal basis to decide the present application 
either directly or by analogy.”
These decisions would seem to draw a line under any future efforts by the 
EFTA Court to interpret the EEA legal system so as to be able to adapt such system 
to the challenges of  the new, post-Lisbon environment. Consequently, Fredriksen & 
Franklin have indicated92 that the Court’s statements in both preceding cases “ought 
to be interpreted primarily as a warning to the contracting parties of  the need to 
revise the main part of  the EEA Agreement,” a point which has so far not been 
heeded. In fact, they claimed93 that such view receives strong support from the way 
in which the EFTA Court actually interprets EEA law in the light of  new EU rules 
in cases where this is required so that homogeneity can be maintained between EU 
and EEA law.
Indeed, as Fredriksen & Franklin have cogently argued,94 the lack of  an EEA 
parallel either to the concept of  EU citizenship (Arts 20-25 TFEU) or to the EU 
Charter on Fundamental Rights, as interpreted by the CJEU, has not stopped the 
EFTA Court from attaining the same practical results in individual cases before it,95 
thereby ensuring the continuing dynamic homogeneity between the two systems. 
Further, more recently, Wahl has noted96 that the EFTA Court, following the entry 
into force of  the Lisbon Treaty, stated in IBR Corp. v. Kaupping97 that “[t]he objective 
of  establishing a dynamic and homogeneous European Economic Area can only 
be achieved if  EFTA and EU citizens and economic operators enjoy, relying on 
EEA law, the same rights in both the EU and EFTA pillars of  the EEA.” Moreover, 
according to the EFTA Court in Schenker,98 “[t]he application of  homogeneity cannot 
be restricted to the interpretation of  the provisions whose wording is identical in 
substance to parallel provisions of  EU law.” These later positions adopted by the 
EFTA Court seem to be in spirit at variance, to some extent, with its earlier views in 
Einarsson and Postdoc.
It may therefore be wondered why the EFTA Court would use its evident 
interpretative dexterity to bridge the gap between the EU and EFTA-EEA legal 
orders in these fields but not in relation to national identity which is a concept – as 
shown previously in this article – that also existed in an earlier incarnation in the pre-
Maastricht EEC legal order, i.e., at the time of  the signature of  the EEA Agreement. 
91 Ibid, para. 55. 
92 H.H. Fredriksen and C.N.K. Franklin, “Of  pragmatism and principles: the EEA Agreement 20 
years on”, in Common Market Law Review, 52, Issue 3, 2015, 629–684, 629, 637.
93 Ibid (citing as examples Judgment LO, Case E-8/00, footnote 76; and Judgment Sigmarsson, Case 
E-3/11, footnote 61).
94 Ibid, 638-650. 
95 See as an example of  the former situation, Judgment Gunnarsson, Case E-26/13, [2014] EFTA Ct 
Rep 254, and as an example of  the latter situation, Judgment Deveci, Case E-10/14, [2014] EFTA Ct 
Rep 1364.
96 N. Wahl, “Uncharted Waters: Reflections on the Legal Significance of  the Charter under EEA 
Law and Judicial Cross-Fertilisation in the Field of  Fundamental Rights,” in The EEA and the EFTA 
Court: Decentred Integration, EFTA Court (ed.), chap 23, 2014, 281, 283-284.
97 Judgment Irish Bank Resolution Corporation v. Kaupping, Case E-18/11, [2012] EFTA Ct Rep 592, 
629, para. 122. 
98 Judgment Schenker North AB v. EFTA Surveillance Authority, Case E-14/11, [2012] EFTA Ct Rep 
1178, 1204, para. 78.
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One answer to that was provided by Fredriksen99 who proposed that the EFTA 
Court in Einarsson and Postdoc had rejected an analogous interpretation of  the more 
recent provisions on national identity and positive discrimination in the EU Treaty 
since such interpretation would have been at the expense of  private rights under 
the EEA Agreement. Accordingly, he posited, recognition of  the principle of  legal 
certainty as a barrier to an “excessively” dynamic interpretation of  EEA law was an 
unavoidable position if  individuals’ rights under the EEA Agreement were to be 
taken seriously.
5. Conclusion
Absent a revision to the EEA Agreement,100 the EFTA Court apparently refuses 
to consider any CJEU development of  the content of  “national identity” following 
on from Art 4(2) TEU. But such position would clearly run counter to the EFTA 
Court’s avowed assertion of  the dynamic and homogeneous nature of  the EEA. 
This position presupposes that Art. 4(2) TEU has the same effect as former 
Art. 6(3)/F(1) TEU: but while the CJEU in Commission v. Luxembourg101 noted that 
the preservation of  national identity in the latter Article a legitimate aim respected by 
the Community legal order, it seems to imply that it was not justiciable on its own.
The Lisbon Treaty has altered the context of  the identity clause102 and has 
determined a possible change in usage by the CJEU so that, while sometimes used 
on its own as a justification for a national restriction on a free movement right, 
Art 4(2) TEU usually operates as a way of  imbuing content into free movement 
exceptions contained in the TFEU or perhaps through precedent CJEU case-law 
(e.g., Cassis de Dijon). In such way, the CJEU interpretation of  the justifiable domestic 
restrictions on free movement is evolving beyond a clause determining constitutional 
competence (“constitutional identity”) into a more nuanced clause deployed in the 
“ordinary” course of  Internal Market litigation to add a further dimension to national 
limitations or even to provide a broader conceptual framework encompassing both 
the constitutional and ordinary aspects. 
Such evolution has repercussions for the EEA and the EFTA Court. Under 
Recital 15 of  the Preamble to the EEA Agreement, it states:
[I]n full deference to the independence of  the courts, the objective of  the Contracting 
Parties is to arrive at, and maintain, a uniform interpretation and application of  
this Agreement and those provisions of  Community legislation which are 
substantially reproduced in this Agreement and to arrive at an equal treatment 
of  individuals and economic operators as regards the four freedoms and 
the conditions of  competition.
In order to maintain the homogeneity, the EFTA Court may be called on again 
to revise its approach and interpret EEA law to conform to the new CJEU mandatory 
requirements founded on respect of  national identity. Granted that the identity 
clause was not in the original EEA Agreement but neither were other (constitutional) 
99 H.H. Fredriksen, “Bridging the Widening Gap between the EU Treaties and the Agreement on 
the European Economic Area”, in European Law Journal, Vol. 18, Issue 6, 2012, 868-886, 883.
100 Fredriksen, ibid, 884-885; Graver, footnote 53, 86. 
101 Judgment Commission v. Luxembourg, Case C-473/93, footnote 24, para. 35.
102 Guastaferro, footnote 7, 287-289.
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principles: EFTA Court interpretative dexterity in Sveinbjörnsdóttir is enough authority 
to show what can be achieved where the need to maintain homogeneity and protect 
economic operators is concerned. Moreover, its ability to go further in certain areas, 
in what has been termed “creative homogeneity,”103 indicates a general preparedness 
on the part of  the EFTA Court to consider such a possibility. Any alternative, thereby 
allowing a divergence in interpretation between EU and EEA law to emerge of  the 
permissible national restrictions on free movement – through use or ignorance of  
preserving national identity – would lead to differences in the Internal Market which 
may be difficult to bridge.104 
In order to preserve the overall coherence in the Internal Market, then, the 
EFTA Court could overcome its reticence to recognize a broad or general principle 
of  respect for national identity in the EFTA-EEA system, much in the same way the 
CJEU is progressing in the Union. Thus national identity – although contested at 
the penumbrae – would remain at its core an essentially-agreed concept105 covering 
a plethora of  constitutional, political and socio-economic aspects derived, inter 
alia, from public policy preferences in the Internal Market and evolved by dialogue 
between the CJEU, EFTA Court and the national courts of  the 31 EEA states. 
Clearly the EFTA Court needs to play a continuing and active role in that dialogue.106
Nevertheless, limitations remain as to how far the EFTA Court may progress 
this inter-judicial discourse. Indeed, given the difference in objectives between the 
two systems, it is conceivable that the EFTA Court would (at most) be able – echoing 
the words of  Baudenbacher’s previous extrajudicial formulae – to recognize the 
existence of  a “quasi-national identity” in the EEA legal order.107
103 C. Timmermans, “Creative Homogeneity” in M. Johansson, N. Wahl & U. Bernitz (eds), in Liber 
Amicorum in Honour of  Sven Norberg: A European for all seasons, 2006, 471-484. And yet, it would appear 
that creative homogeneity is coming towards the end of  its shelf  life, at least under the present 
EEA Agreement. Fredriksen & Franklin (footnote 93, 681-684) have cogently argued for revisions 
in this Agreement contingent upon the changes wrought to the EU legal order over the time of  
the Agreement’s operation since 1992 which increasingly make it necessary for the EFTA Court 
to go to ever greater lengths in its commitment to ensuring continuing homogeneity. So far it has 
managed to keep the EFTA-EEA States on track with the developments in the EU but allegedly at 
some cost to the coherence in its decision-making.
104 Fredriksen, footnote 99.
105 Tatham, footnote 1, 19-30.
106 Baudenbacher, footnote 3, on judicial dialogue within the EU, see Tatham, footnote 1, 30-39. 
107 Baudenbacher, footonote 43, 13, 25-26.
